“A High Degree of Confidentiality Would Result in Increased Openness”

New insights from the official Raoul Wallenberg case file in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New insights from the official Raoul Wallenberg case file in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Photo: www.rwi-70.de

August 1, 2022

Susanne Berger Vadim Birstein

A new review of documentation released in 2019 from the Raoul Wallenberg case file in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows growing indications that Swedish and Russian officials agreed to withhold information from the general public and researchers at key moments during the official inquiry of Wallenberg’s fate (1991–2000)

“All Information is now open”

In this year’s “summer chat” on Swedish Radio — a popular series during the summer months which allows prominent Swedes to share their personal thoughts on life and work — Gudrun Persson, one of Sweden’s leading experts on Russia and questions of national security, brings the problem with historical archives to a succinct point: Rather than taking the information they contain at face value, Persson explains, researchers should consider it their main task to determine what has been left out. She goes on to quote a high-level Russian diplomat upbraiding a novice colleague who delivered a verbatim account of an official conversation for his review. “Young idiots! The point is not to write down what was said, but what should have been said.”[1]

The resulting problems for historians are obviously not only limited to Russia.

On August 22, 2019, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally announced that 74 years after Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance in the Soviet Union, all records of his case are open and accessible to the public.[2] The new release, covering the years 1970-present, added 40, 000 pages to the Ministry’s official Wallenberg case file, bringing the total to approximately 170,000. In her official statement the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrőm stressed that only about 230 documents, less than a half per cent of the total file, remain officially classified. The implication was clear: Virtually all information in the Wallenberg case is now publicly available and the Swedish government has nothing else to share on the subject.

Wallstrőm’s statement obscures the fact that the official Raoul Wallenberg case file is far from complete. Serious misconceptions persist concerning the content and organization of the archival documentation in the Wallenberg case. This is not simply a matter of the accidental omission or oversight of certain materials, as Swedish Foreign Ministry officials routinely argue. Instead, problems with official data collection and proper storage continue to affect the Foreign Ministry’s Wallenberg file, with serious consequences for the continuing inquiry into his fate.

The organizational structure of the Raoul Wallenberg case file

Since March 1945, all papers related to Raoul Wallenberg have been collected in a dossier in the Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive carrying the designation P2 Eu 1 and P2 Eu 1/spec. (“The search for Raoul Wallenberg”).[3] All relevant information is supposed to have been gathered and filed in this central case file, including all official reports, memoranda, related correspondence (both internal and external discussions), as well as communications with various governmental agencies and individual actors, at home and abroad. The file, therefore, constitutes the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s historical Wallenberg case record.

There is a general belief that all documentation concerning Raoul Wallenberg is automatically stored in the official case file, especially in the age of digitalization. In fact, only documentation that has been specifically selected and properly designated by Swedish officials and archivists is filed there. Consequently, many records that should be included the Wallenberg case file are archived outside of it. This especially applies to documents which make no direct mention of Raoul Wallenberg’s name, but which nevertheless have a direct or indirect bearing on his case. They are often archived in separate collections, with no cross reference to the central case file. Obvious examples include records pertaining to events in Hungary during WWII (including information about the Hungarian resistance movement), specific reports about the Holocaust or Sweden’s involvement in Jewish rescue operations.

Similarly, documentation that may be of great interest to Wallenberg researchers, i.e., background information about the Soviet Union, the Soviet state security apparatus and its prison system, or information about other Swedish citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union may not be filed in the Wallenberg dossier. In fact, the number of additional files and collections where possible information of interest to the Wallenberg inquiry might be located are so diverse and numerous that a full description goes beyond the scope of this article.

Aside from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other Swedish agencies, too, maintain their own, separate case files and/or collections in the Wallenberg case, such as the one located in the archive of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) or the Swedish Ministry of Justice (Justitiedepartementet), as well as various Swedish intelligence archives, including that of the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST). While many of the same records are found in each of these collections, there are also important differences.

“The Golden Safe” — important documentation held outside the official Wallenberg case file

Documents carrying the designation “top secret” and beyond, as well as sensitive internal correspondence, including confidential instructions, are often archived separately, at least temporarily, in files or safes specifically designated for this purpose. These papers are eventually to be transferred into the official case file. However, this procedure is not always followed. Instead, in some instances, the papers are archived in other, more general Foreign Ministry collections or are preserved only in the archives of other Swedish agencies.

This is precisely what happened with records about the confidential behind-the-scenes discussions during the 1960s regarding a possible exchange of Soviet agent Stig Wennerström (a Swedish Air Force Colonel arrested in 1963 for Soviet espionage) for full disclosure about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. These highly secret contacts involved the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Political Department, the Cabinet Secretary, the Swedish Security Police, the Prime Minister’s office, as well as contacts in East Germany.[4] The Foreign Ministry records were placed in the so-called “Gula Skåpet” (“Golden Safe”) maintained by the head of the Ministry’s Political Department (and/or Cabinet Secretary).[5] The documentation remained there at least until the late 1980s (see Fig. 1). Researchers became aware of the material only in the mid-1990s, during a review of the Raoul Wallenberg case file in the Swedish Security Police.[6]

Fig. 1. November 7, 1989, Cable from the Swedish Embassy Prague [Lars-Åke Nilsson] to Martin Hallqvist, Swedish Foreign Office, Stockholm, concerning the Wallenberg-Wennerstrőm exchange discussions of the 1960s. Nilsson explained that “nothing is found in the [Wallenberg dossier], but possibly some papers [are kept] in the Golden Safe.”

That same review also revealed that at least one important memorandum regarding the Wallenberg-Wennerstrőm exchange question authored by Otto Danielsson, chief investigator of the Swedish Security Police, had been withdrawn from SÄPO’s Wallenberg case file. The file includes a note, dated November 11, 1974, which reads: “Svingel, Carl-Gustav, Swedish; working and living in West Berlin. He left information in the Wallenberg case. Documents are with RPC [Rikspolis Chef, National Police Chief].” When asked about these records, the former Swedish National Police Chief Carl Persson refused to return the borrowed papers, with the exception of one letter.[7]

Fig. 2 Swedish Air Force colonel Stig E. C. Wennerstrőm Source: Wikipedia

Other examples of “special handling” of documentation in the Wallenberg case

Given these facts, the possibility cannot be excluded that additional relevant documentation in the Wallenberg case subject to “special handling” was archived outside of the official Wallenberg case file of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. For example, the August 2019 release of additional records in the Wallenberg case did not include a single document about the lawsuit filed in the United States by Raoul Wallenberg’s brother Guy von Dardel against the Soviet Union in October 1985 (Guy von Dardel et al vs the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)[8] The litigation which lasted until 1989 should have prompted a lively internal and external discussion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including in its missions abroad, as well as with outside agencies, such as the Swedish Justice Department, and various foreign actors (including diplomats, lawyers, legal and financial experts, etc.). It is doubtful that all information related to this issue was declassified prior to 2019.[9]

The 2019 release also did not include two key documents from 2011 and 2012 respectively which show that two high level FSB officials — Col. Vladimir Vinogradov, deputy head of the FSB Directorate of Registration and Archival Collections (URAF) and his superior, Lt. General Vasily Khristoforov (at the time head of the FSB URAF) — directly confirmed that Wallenberg almost certainly was identical with an as yet unidentified Prisoner no. 7 who was interrogated for 16 ½ hours on July 23, 1947 in the Internal (Lubyanka) Prison in Moscow. (Fig. 3) As a result, the two FSB officials concluded that Wallenberg “could have been alive after the [official death] date of July 17, 1947, stated in the so-called Smoltsov Report.”[10] This marked the first time two top level FSB representatives had directly called into question the official [Soviet and Russian] version of Wallenberg’s fate in Soviet imprisonment.

Fig. 3 Excerpt from a cipher fax of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, dated October 19, 2011: “Vinogradov emphasized for [Swedish diplomat John] Svensson that Wallenberg not only “can” have been interrogated on the 23rd [of July] but that it was sure [that he was] and tochno [certainly so].” The memo was not included among the 40,000 additional pages of the Raoul Wallenberg case file released by the Swedish Foreign Ministry in August 2019.

It needs to be clarified whether the omission of these two documents from the Raoul Wallenberg case file was “accidental” — a clerical error, as the Swedish side maintains — or perhaps intentional.[11] It should be noted that neither Raoul Wallenberg’s family nor researchers were informed of the important information contained in these memos at the time, nor did these details find their way into an official Swedish review of the Wallenberg case from late 2012.[12] Swedish officials also did not vigorously protest the fact that this information had been intentionally withheld by the Russian side during the decade-long Swedish-Russian Working Group investigation (1991–2000) — a crucial omission. Instead, they seemingly accepted the Russian explanation that the new information “did not matter” because Wallenberg presumably died a short time later. Swedish officials did not inquire on what sources Russian officials based their claim.

Even documents included in the case file may not tell the complete story

The foregoing raises the question of what other information may exist in Swedish files that researchers do not yet know about? For example, Swedish officials routinely ask foreign governments if they object to the release of certain types of information (involving specific sources and methods of obtaining information which directly involve or concern them).[13] It is not known if currently any material remains classified as a result of the objections from foreign entities. For example, at different times both Israel and the Netherlands objected to the release of some details contained in certain witness testimonies.[14] Israeli officials worried that some of the information could possibly reveal Israel’s intelligence networks in some iron curtain countries. Also, in connection with the official release of documentation concerning the time period after 1991, over 400 documents related to the Soviet Union/Russia were initially withheld for a closer review.[15] Similarly, it remains unclear if Swedish officials have objected to the release of any documentation related to the Wallenberg case by foreign governments.[16]

Additionally, there are indications that even the information included in various official memos should be treated with caution. Words can be deceiving. If Russian officials promise “full clarity” in the Wallenberg case, does this mean full information regarding Raoul Wallenberg’s presumed death in 1947 or full clarity about all circumstances of his fate, including the reasons for his imprisonment?

On the Swedish side, some interesting questions arise as well. After an internal discussion with a group of fellow diplomats in January 1985, Torsten Ȍrn, at the time the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, made a direct request to his colleagues in Stockholm to adjust the official notes of conversation regarding the official Swedish approach to the Wallenberg case (see Fig. 4).[17] “As you may remember,” Ȍrn wrote,

“I already during the meeting of January 31st expressed a certain hesitation [reservation] with regards to the idea that this exchange of ideas is to be formally recorded. Since that is now the case, I wonder if you could make an editorial adjustment to the summary of my remarks. My editorial adjustments are aimed at the outside reader who, despite the secrecy stamp, may [be feared to] read the notes.”

The fact that the content of the memorandum was adjusted was withheld until 2019. (Fig. 5)

Fig. 4 Excerpt of memorandum sent by Ambassador Torsten Ȍrn to Peter Osvald, February 22, 1985

Fig. 5 Protocol of the meeting from January 1985 by Mikael Westerlind, February 27, 1985. The note in the upper right-hand corner reads “Replaces the earlier memorandum of February 12, 1985

“A high degree of confidentiality would result in increased openness from the KGB”

Despite public claims that Swedish officials would leave “no stone unturned” in the Wallenberg investigation, an internal Swedish Foreign Ministry memorandum regarding the Wallenberg case dated December 19, 1989, shows that even with the Soviet Union collapsing, neither the Swedish nor the Soviet/Russian governments wished to create an independent, international investigation. In particular, the Swedish side worried that such an approach would not allow sufficient flexibility “for [our] own possible actions in the future.” [18] The memo also stated that the control of the inquiry could not be left entirely to Raoul Wallenberg’s family and the Stockholm Raoul Wallenberg Committee, because “we are working from different vantage points [in the case].”

Fig. 6 Excerpt from a Swedish Foreign Ministry memorandum dated December 19, 1989.

In plain language this means that from the start, the Wallenberg investigation was marred by an inherent conflict of interest. Family members and researchers were intent on discovering the full details of Wallenberg’s fate and the reasons behind it. While many Swedish and Russian officials undoubtedly privately shared this goal, their primary aim was to solve the case just far enough so it could be removed from the two countries’ official political agenda and bilateral relations could move ahead. They did not reveal this difference in priorities publicly, however — or to Wallenberg’s family.

For their part, as early as April 1991, Russian officials had made their position clear: They considered it an established fact that Wallenberg had died in 1947 and presented Swedish officials with a “minimalistic work list” that should be pursued in order to close the case.[19] Interestingly, they also very directly suggested that “a high degree of confidentiality would result in increased openness on the part of the KGB.”[20] In other words, the Russian government suggested some type of understanding: Apparently, its security services would be more forthcoming if Swedish officials kept some details of what they learned to themselves. This matter, too, deserves further examination.

The official Swedish reaction was initially cautious, with [then] Swedish Minister Hans Magnusson noting that “we do not have any direct interest in secretiveness [hemlighetsmakeriet], but we can well consider some degree of confidentiality while the work proceeds.” He also emphasized that the request for confidentiality should not prevent “independent experts to review archival materials.” (He did not specify how such a review would be managed, i.e., if these materials were to be reviewed in the original or in copy form). A few days later, Ambassador Berner took up the same issue, adding that the KGB was clearly opposed to the participation of independent Soviet/Russian experts in any official Working Group or commission.[21] Swedish officials eventually acquiesced to Russian requests on this point and several others. The result was a tiered system of information sharing, not only outside of the Group but among members (including Guy von Dardel) and independent consultants. By not making Russian demands public — as well as the fact that the KGB in the spring of 1991 had abruptly closed access to key collections to several Russian experts — both Swedish and Russian officials maintained the appearance (and partial illusion) of an open and mostly unhindered investigation. It needs to be clarified if during the subsequent ten-years long Wallenberg inquiry Swedish and Russian officials ever arrived at an understanding not to share certain information or details with researchers, Raoul Wallenberg’s family or the general public.

A call for a new investigation

Based on these and other recent research findings, members of Raoul Wallenberg’s family are requesting a new Swedish inquiry regarding the official handling of his fate during the decisive period of 1945–47, but also in later years and especially during the Working Group investigation of the 1990s. If there was a spoken or unspoken understanding between Swedish and Russian officials regarding the Wallenberg inquiry, it needs to be determined what exactly this “understanding” entailed and what specific issues it may have covered. As it turns out, even 77 years after his alleged death, Raoul Wallenberg’s case file raises far more questions than it answers.

Notes

[1] Cited in Gudrun Perssons Sommarprat, Sveriges Radio P1, June 29, 2022. https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/gudrun-perssons-sommarprat-i-text The quoted Russian diplomat is Oleg Grinevsky, the former Russian Ambassador to Stockholm from 1991–97.

[2] See https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2019/08/170-000-dokument-om-raoul-wallenberg-nu-i-regeringens-oppna-arkiv/ A major release of witness statements and related documentation took place in 1965, and again in 1980, followed by another release in 1997. In 2000, the Swedish Foreign Ministry instituted an official online database that contains supposedly all available testimonies in the Wallenberg case and copies of all official documents received by the Swedish-Russian Working Group (1991–2000). In some cases, it remains unclear if the complete testimony has been released. Some important questions remain about new witness testimonies, meaning those received after 2000. There is no formal procedure in place of informing Raoul Wallenberg’s family or researchers about these statements or other new information or documents received by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of the statements received since 2000 have been included in the official database. Despite numerous reminders to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the online database has now been out of service for over two years.

[3] Before March 1945, all records regarding the Wallenberg case were archived in [a separate file in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled ] P2 Eu 1 and 2 (Swedish diplomatic and consular affairs, Hungary 1944–45); the Swedish Embassy in Moscow’s special dossier on Raoul Wallenberg (RW I, 1944–45); HP 21 Eu I-XXII (Questions related to national minorities, 1944–45); HP 21 Eu/allmänt I-III (July 1944–45); as well as HP 80 Ea.

[4] See the discussions between Carl-Gustav Svingel and representatives of the Swedish Security Police 1965 -1974, in Susanne Berger. The Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case. 2000.

[5] It is not clear how exactly the procedure of secrecy designation worked in the past and how it functions today. Aside from the regular Archive Department, the Foreign Ministry also has a separate department concerned with issues of secrecy (formerly known as sekretariatet för säkerhet, sekretess och beredskap [Secretariat for security, secrecy and readiness]) Through the years, Swedish officials would regularly file relevant documentation in the Wallenberg case in separate “Arbetsdossierer” (Work dossiers), especially concerning witness statements in the Raoul Wallenberg case. Highly sensitive records were sometimes placed in special folders or even a separate safe. A special cross-referencing system allowed officials to keep track of the records. It consisted of separate reference lists (Företeckning), which carried special designations like “red” or “blue” reference sheets (Hänvisningslappar, i.e., “rőda pärm”, [red file], “blå pärm” [blue file]), for specific years. In rare cases, special forms (Blankett) were used that indicated documentation and correspondence which were considered so highly confidential that it prevented their placement in the regular archive dossier.

[6] Susanne Berger. Swedish Aspects of the Wallenberg case. 2000. Another, more recent example is a document from 1945 that was discovered in a safe of the Swedish Ministry of Finance only in 2008, 70 years after it was received. It is a letter dated April 21, 1941, from Ernst Herslow, Director of Skandinaviska Banken to Ernst Wigforss, the Swedish Finance Minister at the time. The letter concerned the extension of Swedish banking credits to German ship building companies, for payment to Swedish business partners, to facilitate the construction of several ships for Germany. Wigforss, as well as his successors, clearly deemed the matter highly sensitive. The letter was never formally registered in the Ministry archives and was never placed in its official archive collections. See Bo Hammarlund and Krister Wahlbäck, “Arkivfynd avslöjar beslutet om första svenska krediten till Nazityskland” [Archive discovery reveals the decision regarding the first Swedish credit to Nazi Germany]. Klara, 2009. See also Peter Vinthagen Simpson, “Sweden approved secret Nazi loan: Report”, The Local, February 15, 2009. https://www.thelocal.se/20090215/17604

[7] Ibid. Carl Persson cited the document in his memoir Utan Omsvep: Ett Liv I Maktens Centrum. Norstedt: Stockholm, 1990.

[8]U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia — 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985)
 October 15, 1985

[9] The documentation regarding the litigation that was previously made available in the Wallenberg case file contains mostly newspaper clippings.

[10] Memorandum from the former Swedish Ambassador Hans Magnusson about his meeting with Lt. General V. S. Khristoforov. November 9, 2012.Magnusson headed the Swedish side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group that investigated Raoul Wallenberg’s fate in Russia (1991–2000).Khristoforov was referring to the report by A. L. Smoltsov, head of the Medical Unit of the Lubyanka Prison in 1947, in which Smoltsov claimed that Wallenberg died of sudden cardiac arrest in his prison cell.

[11] There are several other examples. Listing them goes beyond the scope of this article.

[12] Hans Magnusson. Lägesbedömning (2012) https://www.rwi-70.de/documents/official-review-2012/

[13] https://www.fritz-bauer-forum.de/en/they-didnt-want-him-back/

[14] Regarding the objections raised by representatives of the Netherlands, see memorandum Thomas Ganslandt to Sven Julin, dated June 10, 1997.

[15] Memorandum by Sven Julin, “RW-dokumentens hantering” [The handling of Raoul Wallenberg documents], January 15, 1998. It has not been possible yet to determine if all of them have now been released or if some details remain classified.

[16] One important gap of information concerns the interviews Soviet officials conducted with Raoul Wallenberg’s colleagues in Hungary in February-March 1945. These conversations almost certainly resulted in official reports and correspondence of some kind, none of which have been released. Similarly, only very few records have been released from Russian archives regarding information and contacts with members of the Wallenberg business family. There is currently no indication that Swedish officials have prevented these releases.

[17] Memo Torsten Ȍrn to Peter Osvald, February 22, 1985 [”som trots hemligstämpeln kan befaras få del av nedteckningen”]

[18] Internal memorandum dated December 19, 1989,P2 EU 1.

[19] Cable from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 24, 1991.

[20] Cable from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow (Hans Magnusson) to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Martin Hallqvist), June 4, 1991); and a cable from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow (Ȍrjan Berner) to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 10, 1991.

[21] ibid. Berner stressed that these individuals — in particular Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky — had proven their research skill and expertise which other members of the Working Group lacked.