Press Release
A group of Swedish historians, researchers and journalists criticize the flawed application of Swedish secrecy laws, call on the Swedish National Archives to conduct an official review
The Swedish National Archives applies secrecy restrictions unnecessarily strictly and unpredictably, which hurts both research and citizens’ right to information.
On Thursday, December 7, 2023, a group of Swedish historians, researchers and journalists sent a formal letter of complaint to the Transparency Council of the Swedish National Archive. (Please see the Swedish original and an English translation enclosed below, Enclosure 1)
In the letter, the group advises the Council about what it perceives as the often unreasonable application of secrecy restrictions in Swedish archives governing the release of documentation dating from World War II and the post-war years, in particular documentation from the archive of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO).
“We are concerned that research in very central areas [..] is curtailed by the National Archives' unreasonable handling of secrecy and permission for access. Research on, first of all, Sweden during World War II, the Holocaust and the early post-war years is disproportionately affected. Access by journalists and other Swedish citizens to the information in the archives is also an inalienable part of a well-functioning democracy. We therefore ask that the Transparency Council and the management of the National Archives review the application of the regulations and adapt them to the spirit of the law and democratic society, research and journalism's demands for openness.”
As the group notes, public access in Sweden to historical records often does not comply with the standards set by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in particular its special addendum (158) that allows for the publication of documents that are of public interest. The addendum states specifically that
“Public authorities or public or private bodies that hold records of public interest should be services which, pursuant to Union or Member State law, have a legal obligation to acquire, preserve, appraise, arrange, describe, communicate, promote, disseminate and provide access to records of enduring value for general public interest. Member States should also be authorized to provide that personal data may be further processed for archiving purposes, for example with a view to providing specific information related to the political behavior under former totalitarian state regimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust, or war crimes.”
Instead, the authors of the public letter point out,
“Strict secrecy is applied regarding documents concerning Nazi Germany, a state that does no longer exist. As for the methods used by the Swedish intelligence services, its collaborations and exchange of information with foreign powers during World War II and the early post-war period, are well documented in research and therefore not something that can harm the [Swedish] Security Services today. In other words, there is no reason to routinely classify these documents.”
The problem regarding the flawed application of Swedish secrecy rules was first raised by two Swedish academics, Andreas Gedin and Pontus Rudberg, in a commentary article published this past August 21st in Svenska Dagbladet, entitled ”Orimlig sekretess på Riksarkivet” (Unreasonable Secrecy at the Swedish National Archives). The authors argued that the Swedish National Archives applies secrecy restrictions unnecessarily strictly and unpredictably, “which hurts both research and the citizens’ right to information.” (You can find the English translation). As a prime example authors cite the continued censoring of the Swedish Security Police dossier on the former SS General Walter Schellenberg.
The Swedish Security Police dossiers of Swedish diplomats Sverker Åstrőm and Rolf Sohlman
As part of the formal submission of the public letter to the Transparency Council of the Swedish National Archives, I also presented a separate submission in support of the filing. Please see the enclosed copy below (Enclosure 3). In the letter, I argue that
“When weighing the potential benefit or harm done by releasing sensitive information to the public, legislators and archivists should also ask themselves what presumed harm to the public interest is worse - to learn the truth about events that occurred six, seven or even eight decades in the past or to not be informed at all?”



I draw special attention to the questionable application of secrecy rule in the Raoul Wallenberg investigation which has by now spanned close to eight decades. In particular, I examine the official responses by the Swedish Security Police and the National Archives to the requests that were submitted in 2022 by two family members of Raoul Wallenberg (his nieces Marie E. Dupuy and Louise von Dardel) and researchers (Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger) to review the Swedish Security Police dossiers of two Swedish diplomats - Sverker Åstrőm and Rolf Sohlman. Both men played a central role in the investigation of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance in the Soviet Union after 1945. Both officials also faced serious suspicions about their possible role as Soviet agents or assets throughout their long careers.
As part of the request, the applicants pointed out that if the suspicions against Mr. Åstrőm were untrue, he deserved to be publicly exonerated. We therefore asked the Swedish Security Police to issue a simple and direct statement if the accusations against Mr. Åstrőm are true or false, since it would not require the release of any still classified information. Despite this fact, the request was denied, as was access to the official dossiers, either in part (Åstrőm) or in full (Sohlman). The reasoning and justification offered by the Swedish Security Police for this decision makes for interesting reading. The Court of Appeals simply confirmed the decision earlier this year. (Kammarrätten, 2023-02-6).
Other examples involving excessive secrecy restrictions - the case of Dawit Isaak
The problem of excessive secrecy restrictions also affects more recent cases - including that of Swedish-Eritrean author and playwright Dawit Isaak who has been imprisoned in Eritrea for 22 years.


In 2022, an official, parliament requested/government appointed Commission of Inquiry (Granskningskommission, SOU 2022:55) was denied access to records concerning Dawit Isaak by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though the Commission was specifically tasked to review all documentation concerning the official Swedish handling of Mr. Isaak’s case. The records of the work of this Commission are held in the Swedish National Archive. A request by the Swedish chapter of Reporters without Borders (RSF/RUG) to review the full set of documentation was denied. This included records that had been previously released to the public.
Here is the text released on the RSF/RUG t website. See also the English translation enclosed below (Enclosure 4).
For questions and additional information regarding the public letter to the Transparency Council of the Swedish National Archives please contact
Pontus Rudberg pontusrudberg@hotmail.com
For all other inquiries, please send me a message at
sberger37@hotmail.com
Susanne Berger
Founder and Coordinator, RWI-70
Enclosure 1
Public Letter to the Transparency Council of the Swedish National Archives
In Swedish
Stockholm den 4 december 2023
Till Riksarkivets insynsråd
Vi vill härmed uppmärksamma Riksarkivets insynsråd på hanteringen av sekretess- och tillståndshantering för arkivhandlingar. Det gäller främst hanteringen av Säkerhetspolisens arkiv, som vi uppfattar som onödigt hård, inkonsekvent och oförutsägbar. Det gäller även tillståndshantering för enskilda arkiv som framstår som orimlig. Som forskare eller undersökande journalistister har vi också kunnat konstatera att Riksarkivet överlag gör striktare bedömningar än motsvarande arkiv i Europa.
I somras påtalade två av oss detta i en debattartikel (Gedin & Rudberg, SvD 21, 29, 31/8, 2023), men fick en intetsägande replik från Riksarkivet, som inte svarade på kritiken. Statliga myndigheter måste motivera sina beslut och hanteringen är därför inte oacceptabelt för en statlig myndighet. Se bifogade artiklar.
Enligt en huvudregel skall alla svenska handlingar i Riksarkivet släppas fria efter sjuttio och utländska efter nittio år. Men Riksarkivets tillämpning av några tillägg, framförallt omvänt skaderekvisit och ”människors personliga integritet eller rikets säkerhet”, gör i praktiken dessa regler verkningslösa. Då flera av oss, på olika vägar, fått tillgång till och läst handlingar, som tidigare sekretessbelagts i Sverige, har vi kunnat konstatera att Riksarkivets bedömningar därmed varit orimliga. Uppgifterna kan omöjligen skada någon eller något.
Reglerna och begreppen ”skada”, ”integritet” och ”säkerhet” öppnar för subjektiva tolkningar och det tycks enklast för Riksarkivet att sekretessbelägga handlingar om de är det minsta osäkra på hur de ska hanteras. Det går inte heller att veta om Riksarkivets tjänstemän gjort rätt eller fel eftersom man inte vet vad de belagt med sekretess.
Samma kritik gäller många av Kammarrättens beslut; även för den är det enklare att fälla än fria eftersom den klagande ändå inte vet vad handlingarna innehåller och man slipper på så sätt också att underkänna Riksarkivets bedömningar.
Riksarkivets nuvarande praxis stämmer också illa med Regeringsrättens beslut 2010-06-24, nr. 1516-10 som gav en forskare, med vissa förbehåll, tillgång till handlingar som rörde en levande person som hade arbetat i hemlighet för DDR och för Stasi och levde i Sverige. I domskälen kan man bland annat läsa:
Det är också viktigt att komma ihåg att det hos Säkerhetspolisen finns handlingar som innehåller uppgifter som är av stor betydelse för vårt kulturarv. Dessa uppgifter bör inte undanhållas från allmänhetens insyn mer än vad som är nödvändigt, t.ex. med hänsyn till rikets säkerhet, förebyggande och beivrande av brott och enskildas personliga förhållanden. Regeringen anser därför inte heller att det skall råda absolut sekretess för uppgifter i Säkerhetspolisens register.
Vidare gör Regeringsrätten följande bedömning:
Som framgår av redovisningen av förarbetsuttalanden har lagstiftaren under senare år vid ett flertal tillfällen framhållit det angelägna i en större öppenhet i Säkerhetspolisens verksamhet. De uppgifter B.A. önskar ta del av rör misstankar om underrättelseverksamhet riktad mot Sverige av en stat som inte längre existerar. Uppgifter från Stasiarkiven har i stor utsträckning gjorts offentliga, dels genom den särskilda statliga myndighet i Berlin som bl.a. förvaltar arkiven (BStU-myndigheten), dels genom offentliggörande i vissa länder. … Den resolution från Europaparlamentet som B.A. omnämner bör också beaktas.
För oss är det uppenbart att Riksarkivet inte följer Regeringsrättens domskäl utan tillämpar sekretessen enligt den enklare metoden, hellre fälla än fria. Man tillämpar till exempel hård sekretess vad gäller handlingar rörande Nazityskland, en stat som inte existerar. Vad gäller svensk underrättelsetjänsts metoder, samarbeten och informationsutbyte med främmande makt under andra världskriget och den tidiga efterkrigstiden är de väl belagda i forskningen och därför inte något som kan skada för Säkerhetstjänsten idag. Det finns med andra ord ingen anledning att rutinmässigt belägga dessa handlingar med sekretess.
Under Stockholms internationella forum om Förintelsen i januari 2000 förband sig Sverige och de andra deltagande länderna att ”vidta alla nödvändiga åtgärder för att underlätta öppnandet av arkiv för att säkerställa att dokument som har samband med Förintelsen görs tillgängliga för forskare.” Den utfästelsen lever vare sig Riksarkivet eller domstolarna upp till, trots att det i EU:s GDPR-lag finns ett särskilt tillägg (158) som möjliggör tillgängliggörandet av sådana och andra handlingar av allmänt intresse. I detta tillägg står det bland annat:
Public authorities or public or private bodies that hold records of public interest should be services which, pursuant to Union or Member State law, have a legal obligation to acquire, preserve, appraise, arrange, describe, communicate, promote, disseminate and provide access to records of enduring value for general public interest. Member States should also be authorised to provide that personal data may be further processed for archiving purposes, for example with a view to providing specific information related to the political behaviour under former totalitarian state regimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust, or war crimes.
Vi ser med oro på att forskning inom helt centrala områden liksom dess återväxt genom studenters uppsatsarbete inskränks av Riksarkivets orimliga hantering av sekretess och tillstånd. Forskningen om framförallt Sverige under andra världskriget, Förintelsen och de tidiga efterkrigsåren drabbas på ett otillbörligt sätt. Journalisters och övriga svenska medborgares tillgång till uppgifterna i arkiven är vidare en omistlig del i en väl fungerande demokrati. Vi önskar därför att insynrådet och Riksarkivets ledning ser över tillämpningen av regelverken och anpassar dem efter lagens anda och det demokratiska samhällets, forskningens och journalistikens krav på öppenhet.
Dag som ovan,
Andreas Gedin, docent i fri konst
Pontus Rudberg, docent i historia
Bo Rothstein, professor i statsvetenskap
Lars M Andersson, universitetslektor i historia
Göran Rosenberg, författare och journalist
Hans Ruin, professor i filosofi
Jan Winter, författare och journalist
Karin Kvist Geverts, docent i historia
Heléne Lööw, docent i historia
Anders Blomqvist, universitetslektor i historia
Johan Perwe, författare och forskare
Kim Salomon, professor emeritus i historia
Jesper Huor, journalist och författare
Ulf Zander, professor i historia
Lars O Ericsson, docent i praktisk filosofi
Hans Ingvar Roth, professor i mänskliga rättigheter
Susanne Berger, senior fellow, RWCHR
Eva Ekselius, författare
Enclosure 2
English Translation
Stockholm, 7 December 2023
To the Transparency Council
Swedish National Archives
Stockholm
We would like to draw the attention of the National Archives' Transparency Council to the handling of secrecy and public access management for archive documents. This primarily applies to the handling of the archive of the [Swedish] Security Police which we perceive as unnecessarily harsh, inconsistent and unpredictable. This also applies to access management for individual archives, which appears to be unreasonable. As researchers or investigative journalists, we have also been able to ascertain that the Swedish National Archives generally makes stricter assessments than the corresponding archives in Europe.
This summer, two of us addressed this in a debate article (Gedin & Rudberg, SvD 21, 29, 31/8, 2023), but received a bland reply from the National Archives, which did not respond to the criticism. State authorities must justify their decisions and the handling is therefore not unacceptable for a state authority. Please see attached articles.
According to a general rule, all Swedish documents in the National Archives must be released after seventy years and foreign documents after ninety years. But the Riksarkivet's use of certain additional criteria, above all reverse damage criterion (omvänt skaderekvisit) and "people's personal integrity or the security of the realm", renders these rules ineffective in practice. When several of us, in various ways, gained access to and read documents which were previously classified in Sweden, we have been able to establish that the National Archives' assessments were therefore unreasonable. The information cannot possibly harm anyone or anything.
The rules and concepts of "damage", "integrity" and "security" are open to subjective interpretations, and it seems easiest for the National Archives to classify documents as confidential if they are the least bit uncertain about how they should be handled. It is also not possible to know whether the officials of the National Archives have done right or wrong, because it is not known what material they have classified.
The same criticism applies to many of the Court of Appeal's (Kammarrätt) decisions; even for that, it is easier “to convict than to acquit”, because the complainant still does not know what the documents contain, and in this way, one also avoids rejecting the National Archives' assessments.
The National Archives' current practice also does not match the Government Court's decision 24-06-2010, no. 1516-10 which gave a researcher, with certain reservations, access to documents concerning a living person who had worked secretly for the GDR and for the Stasi and lived in Sweden. In the reasons for the judgment, one can read, among other things:
“It is also important to remember that the Security Police has documents that contain information that is of great importance to our cultural heritage. This information should not be withheld from public view more than is necessary, i.e., with regards to the security of the realm, the prevention and prosecution of crime and the personal circumstances of individuals. The government, therefore, also does not consider that there should be absolute secrecy for information in the Security Police's register.”.
Furthermore, the Government Court makes the following assessment:
“As can be seen from the account of the preparatory statements, in recent years the legislator has on several occasions emphasized the importance of greater openness in the activities of the Security Police. The information B.A. wishes to have access to relate to suspicions of intelligence activities directed at Sweden by a state that no longer exists. Information from the Stasi archives has been made public to a large extent, partly through the special government authority in Berlin which, among other things, manages the archives (BStU authority), partly through publication in certain countries. … The resolution of the European Parliament that B.A. mentions should also be considered.
For us, it is obvious that the National Archives does not follow the judgment of the court, but applies the secrecy according to the simpler method – to reject rather than approve. For example, strict secrecy is applied regarding documents concerning Nazi Germany, a state that does not longer exist. As for the methods used by the Swedish intelligence services, its collaborations and exchange of information with foreign powers during World War II and the early post-war period, are well documented in research and therefore not something that can harm the Security Service today. In other words, there is no reason to routinely classify these documents.
During the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in January 2000, Sweden and the other participating countries committed to "take all necessary measures to facilitate the opening of archives to ensure that documents related to the Holocaust are made available to researchers." Neither the National Archives nor the courts live up to that commitment, despite the fact that in the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) law there is a special addendum (158) that allows for the publicizing of those and other documents of public interest. This addendum states, among other things:
“Public authorities or public or private bodies that hold records of public interest should be services which, pursuant to Union or Member State law, have a legal obligation to acquire, preserve, appraise, arrange, describe, communicate, promote, disseminate and provide access to records of enduring value for general public interest. Member States should also be authorized to provide that personal data may be further processed for archiving purposes, for example with a view to providing specific information related to the political behavior under former totalitarian state regimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust, or war crimes.”
We are concerned that research in very central areas as well as its continued growth through students’ thesis work is curtailed by the National Archives' unreasonable handling of secrecy and permission for access. Research on, first of all, Sweden during World War II, the Holocaust and the early post-war years is disproportionately affected. Access by journalists and other Swedish citizens to the information in the archives is also an inalienable part of a well-functioning democracy. We therefore ask that the Transparency Council and the management of the National Archives review the application of the regulations and adapt them to the spirit of the law and democratic society, research and journalism's demands for openness.
Sincerely Yours,
Andreas Gedin, Docent in liberal arts
Pontus Rudberg, Docent in history
Bo Rothstein, Professor of political science
Lars M Andersson, University Lecturer in history
Göran Rosenberg, Author and journalist
Hans Ruin, Professor of philosophy
Jan Winter, Author and journalist
Karin Kvist Geverts, Docent in history
Heléne Lööw, Docent in history
Anders Blomqvist, University lecturer in history
Johan Perwe, Author and researcher
Kim Salomon, Professor Emeritus of History
Jesper Huor, Journalist and author
Ulf Zander, Professor of history
Lars O Ericsson, Docent in practical philosophy
Hans Ingvar Roth, Professor of human rights
Susanne Berger, Senior Fellow, RWCHR
Eva Ekselius, Author
Enclosure 3
Riksarkivets insynsråd Stockholm, Sweden
Susanne Berger Hannover, Germany
December 4, 2023
Re: The structure and practical application of Swedish secrecy laws in the case of Swedish diplomat Raoul G. Wallenberg
Weighing the benefits vs the potential harm done when sharing sensitive information with the public is at the heart of any secrecy legislation and its practical application. However, legislators and archivists also should ask what presumed harm to the public interest is worse - to learn the truth about events that occurred six, seven or even eight decades in the past or to not be informed at all?
Swedish secrecy laws are currently structured in such a way that it is practically impossible for the person who seeks information to argue against secrecy. On the whole, members of the public – including researchers, historians, and journalists - have very few concrete indications about what kind of records fall under the more stringent official Swedish classification guidelines which allow certain documents to be kept secret for up to 90 years. Even when the documents in question are partially known and the secrecy provisions finally expire, difficult obstacles continue to stand in the way of access, especially when they are held in private collections.
Some years ago, after decades of complete closure, the personal papers of Thede Palm, the former head of the Swedish Foreign Intelligence Bureau (T-Kontoret) in the postwar years, were made available to researchers. Yet, despite the lapsed secrecy term and the fact that the collection also contained official documentation generated during Palm’s time in office, parts of the file remained inaccessible. Swedish archivists argued that since Palm's papers constitute a private collection, they fell outside the normal rules governing "Freedom of the Press/Information" (tryckfrihetsförordningen). Archive officials further claimed that they had the right to withhold information contained in 'special collections' (enskilda arkiv), "if the information can be assumed to cause injury or harm to any individual or the public interest."
The debate how to best apply the laws governing secrecy and access to information, is certainly not limited to Sweden. Already back in 2016, Professor Sanford Ungar, the current Director of the Georgetown University Free Speech Project and a member of the Public Interest Declassification Board at the U.S. National Archives (College Park, Maryland), saw a worrying trend. "Government secrecy, especially in matters of foreign policy and national security, is worse than ever," Ungar noted in a commentary in the Washington Post. He also warned that "the overclassification of information increases by the day."
A recent example from my own research work in Sweden regarding the fate of Swedish diplomat and Holocaust hero Raoul G. Wallenberg serves to illustrate this point further.
In 2021, two members of Mr. Wallenberg’s family (his nieces Marie E. Dupuy and Louise von Dardel) along with two researchers (Dr. Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger), filed an application to review the dossiers of two former Swedish diplomats, Sverker Åstrőm and Rolf R. Sohlman (held in the archive of the Swedish Security Police and Riksarkivet, respectively). Both men had a central role in the official investigation of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate after he disappeared in the Soviet Union in January 1945. Both officials also have faced long-standing suspicions that they served as Soviet agents or assets during their careers.
As Ms. Dupuy and Ms. von Dardel outlined in their application,
“The question of whether or not undue Soviet influence was present in the Swedish foreign policy apparatus and if so, how it may have affected the official investigation of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance since 1945 is of central importance to our continuing efforts to determine the full circumstances of his fate in Russia. The family’s right to the truth as well as our need to learn the full facts about Mr. Åstrőm’s and Mr. Sohlman’s contacts with Soviet representatives should outweigh any lingering national security or privacy concerns in the matter. […] “
Regarding Mr. Åstrőm, the applicants stressed that
“77 years after Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance in Hungary, and ten years after Mr. Åstrőm’s death, Swedish authorities must disclose once and for all if the allegations against one of Sweden’s leading diplomats were true or false. Moreover, it must be established whether Mr. Åström or any of his associates ever tried to influence the official Swedish handling of the Wallenberg case, in 1945 and in later years, including the inquiry by the Swedish-Russian Working Group during the 1990s. Mr. Åstrőm was regularly briefed on the Wallenberg inquiry even after his retirement.”
The application to review Mr. Åstrőm’s dossier was denied, except for a small set of documents that had already been released previously. (Beslut, Swedish Security Police (Säkerhetspolisen), Diarienummer 2022 -25939 – 7, dated December 8, 2022). Access to the file of Rolf Sohlman was denied in its entirety. (Riksarkivet, 2023-01-03 RA-FF 2022/086887)
In their appeal filed in January 2023, the applicants expressed doubt that the creators of the law on secrecy foresaw or ever intended such a stringent application. The applicants argued that most of the people whose right to privacy could be affected were no longer alive. Additionally, they saw no reason why some the remaining documentation in Mr. Åstrőm’s and Mr. Sohlman’s files could not be shared, at least in part:
“While it is clear that the privacy rights of individuals mentioned or otherwise referenced in the documentation contained in Mr. Åstrőm’s Swedish Security Police dossier should be protected, in accordance with the rules proscribed by the Swedish Law on Secrecy (Sekretesslagen, 2009:400), it is difficult to understand why this documentation should be withheld in its entirety. In other matters covered by secrecy restrictions proscribed by the official Swedish Secrecy Law partial editing or censorship (such as blacking out of specific names or phrases) allow meeting the necessary confidentiality requirements. The creators of the Law on Secrecy could not have intended that due to certain details covered in a longer document or related material, the rest of the information is censored in its entirety. Additionally, it would seem likely that most of the individuals in question are no longer alive.
In their application, Raoul Wallenberg’s nieces also stressed that if the rumors and accusations against Mr. Åstrőm are known to be false, he deserved to be publicly exonerated. To that end, and to avoid the need to seek the release of still classified documentation, they asked the Swedish Security Police to issue a simple direct statement regarding Mr. Åstrőm’s potential guilt or innocence. This request was also denied. In their response, SÄPO officials argued as follows:
"The Security Police assesses that it cannot be certain that the information whether Carl Sverker Åstrőm was a Soviet agent or not can be revealed without obstructing the purpose of decided or anticipated measures or harming future activity. The information is therefore covered by secrecy according to ch. 18. Section 2 of the Publicity and Confidentiality Act (2009:400).”
It is difficult to see how a simple “yes” or “no” answer to the question posed could possibly affect either the sources or methods of the Swedish Security Police or reveal any sensitive “purpose” behind past or future working decisions. In their appeal, the applicants stressed this very point and also once again emphasized Mr. Åstrőm’s right to exoneration, if he is known to be innocent of the suspicions against him:
“If the various rumors and suspicions that have been voiced against Mr. Åstrőm are unfounded, he deserves to be exonerated. [..] A simple statement by the Swedish Security Police authorities to clear him of any suspicion or guilt would not in any way involve release of currently classified or otherwise sensitive information. If, on the other hand, the information regarding Mr. Åstrőm is currently deemed inconclusive, a statement to this effect also would not compromise or involve classified information in any way. Similarly, given the fact that Mr. Åstrőm died ten years ago (in 2012), it is doubtful that any current activities or investigations by the Swedish Security Police related to his person could be affected in any way by issuing such a clarification.”
The appeal was denied. (Kammarrätten, 2023-02-6)
The decision by the Swedish Security Police left one other important question unaddressed: Whether the decision potentially violates the fundamental right of Mr. Wallenberg and his family to the truth about his fate, close to eighty years after his disappearance.
Yours sincerely,
Susanne Berger
Senior Fellow
The Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR)
Enclosure 4
The Secrecy Around Dawit Isaak Continues
September 28, 2023 Katarina Carlsson
The Court of Appeal has rejected Reporters Without Borders' request to obtain documents f4208/rån of the Commission that reviewed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official handling of the cases of Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai, both Swedish citizens and publicists, imprisoned in Eritrea and China respectively. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been secretive for several years with regards to all documentation relating to its work on behalf of Dawit Isaak, including material that was available 15-20 years ago. Reporters Without Borders has on a couple of occasions in recent years asked for access to at least some material, but has always been refused. Nor are censored documents released. In 2021, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) requested that an independent commission of inquiry be appointed to review Sweden's efforts to free Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai. The Riksdag decided that this commission would receive all material, including classified documents. But the Foreign Ministry and the government ignored the decision and only released "relevant" documents to the commission in Dawit Isaak's case. The commission presented its final report in October 2022. In the report, the Foreign Ministry was criticized for its slow and careless dealings with certain pieces of information. When Sweden's Ambassador to Eritrea traveled to the area six months after Dawit Isaak was arrested [in September 2001], he had no idea about the case. The information [of Isaak’s detention] had gotten stuck in another department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After the commission finished its work, it handed over its records to the National Archives. The documentation is available in five volumes. One of them is secret. It contains interviews the commission conducted and some correspondence. The National Archives justifies its decision by referring to the secrecy rules related to foreign affairs and that the material references personal contacts. We objected [to the finding] that all concrete information is considered harmful and that it has not been tested. But the Court of Appeal in Stockholm followed the National Archives' argumentation in its own judgment KR 4208/23. In other words, the secrecy continues.