The same pattern from Raoul Wallenberg to Dawit Isaak — Part of the truth remains obscure
There is a systemic problem afflicting official Swedish commissions of inquiry. The serious questions surrounding the most recent…
There is a systemic problem afflicting official Swedish commissions of inquiry. The serious questions surrounding the most recent investigations into the cases of Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai are just the latest example.
Originally published in Swedish by Kvartal February 3, 2023
Susanne Berger
Parliamentary oversight and review of the executive branch of government are the hallmarks of any democratic society. Swedish officials rightfully pride themselves on their country’s “openness” and transparency — its so-called “Offentlighetsprincipen” (Principle of Openness), a set of rules and laws governing public access to official information. However, such openness can often have the opposite of the desired effect: When the government is forced by law to release crucial details about its own actions, it tends to find creative ways to circumvent and forestall such disclosures.
Various options for the government to influence commissions of inquiry
There are many ways for government institutions to affect investigations into their official conduct. When Parliament requests a formal governmental inquiry, it is the government that appoints the commission that will carry out the review. So, from the start, this creates an inherent conflict of interest, because the government and its affiliated institutions are, to a certain degree, permitted to investigate themselves. They can influence the membership of the investigative body — meaning, they can try to ensure that certain persons are included or excluded from a specific commission. They can also limit the scope and duration of the inquiry, set limited research parameters and investigative criteria, and prevent access to certain types of documentation.
Needless to say, such restrictions frequently lead to enhanced scrutiny and concerns from public quarters. A case in point are the many questions that continue to swirl around the official police inquiry into the assassination of Sweden’s former Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. [1] A less well known but just as indicative example is the controversy that unfolded in 2000, when several researchers resigned from a Swedish government sponsored project to investigate the history of the Swedish Military Intelligence Services (MUST) after it had become clear that they could not obtain the access to specific documentation necessary to do their work. [2]
A lack of transparency regarding decision-making processes in governmental bodies
Similar concerns also arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, about the investigations into several lingering Swedish Cold War mysteries, including the inquiry into the fate of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg who disappeared in the Soviet Union in 1945, the loss of a DC-3 signal intelligence plane that was shot down over the Baltic Sea in 1952 and the disappearance of more than a dozen Swedish ships and their crews after the end of World War II. [3] The official inquiries were almost entirely controlled by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and associated governmental agencies (even though their own conduct in these cases formed an important part of the review), through the creation of so-called “Working Groups” which functioned with little to no independent oversight or accountability. [4] Wallenberg’s relatives recently called for a reopening of the investigation of his case, based on new research findings that have emerged regarding the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s actions in 1945, as well as the official handling of the decade long Wallenberg inquiry of the 1990s (1991–2000).
The core problem, then, seems to be systemic. Just a few months ago, the work of the official commission examining Sweden’s handling of the COVID pandemic came into the public cross hairs for the government’s failure to provide any meaningful documentation regarding crucial internal deliberations and official decision-making processes. [5] Swedish columnist Inga-Britt Ahlenius, an expert on freedom of information and a former Auditor General of the Swedish National Audit Office [Riksrevisionen], vented her frustration at the fact that during the past 20+ years the twin problems of “empty archives” and the resulting lack of meaningful public information have been repeatedly noted, but no serious actions have been taken to remedy the situation. In short, everyone recognizes the symptoms, while nobody wants to address the underlying cause. Ahlenius writes:
“There is a built-in dilemma in the principle of openness. The fact that documents can immediately become public means that important processes in the government are not documented or kept in the state archives. The Corona Commission […] had difficulties in obtaining information from the government offices and found it surprising that there was no documentation about what kind of discussions were held, who proposed which measures and how officials reasoned when arriving at decisions.”
The narrow wording of official government directives
To no one’s surprise, the very same problems are evident in the work and documentation of the official commission investigating the government’s handling of the cases of Swedish citizens Gui Minhai and Dawit Isaak. The commission presented its final report this past October. [Granskning av arbetet med att försöka uppnå frigivning av Dawit Isaak och Gui Minhai — Regeringen.se SOU 2022:55]. Mr. Isaak and Mr. Gui were both taken from their respective homes and unlawfully imprisoned: Dawit Isaak, a Swedish Eritrean playwright and journalist in Eritrea in 2001 and Swedish publisher Gui Minhai in Thailand (from where he was abducted to China) in 2015.
“During the past 20+ years the twin problems of ‘empty archives’, and the resulting lack of meaningful public information have been repeatedly noted, but no serious actions have been taken to remedy the situation. In short, everyone recognizes the symptoms, while nobody wants to address the underlying cause.”
In the case of Dawit Isaak, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to censor or withhold altogether a set of documents from his consular file. When the Commission chairperson Helena Jäderblom — a respected jurist and former judge at the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) — asked to obtain access to the withheld documentation in April 2022, the Foreign Ministry’s legal department denied the request. According to Jäderblom’s notes of conversation from May 2022, the department’s jurists based their denial on the specific wording contained in a section of the official governmental directive regarding the Commission’s work.[6]
“In the [government’s] directive to the investigation, it is stated that the commission must be given access to all relevant information [my emphasis — SB], including confidential information,[…] With that background, the information that has been censored and the records that have been removed from Dawit Isaak’s file are not relevant to the Commission’s review” [my emphasis — SB].
As the Commission pointed out in its final report, it considered the Foreign Ministry’s decision “wrong” on two counts. [7] The Commission’s task clearly was to review “all” (meaning all existing) documentation concerning Dawit Isaak, “including documentation classified under other secrecy provisions than foreign or consular secrecy”. [8] This was, in fact, exactly how the Parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee [Utrikesutskott] had defined the Commission’s task. [9] Therefore, it seems highly questionable that information covered by any other confidentiality provisions could be withheld from the Commission. [10] Secondly, it should be up to the Commission members to decide what documentation is relevant to their inquiry and what is not. [11]
In the end, everything hinges on the use of the word relevant. While the government’s formal directive to the Commission appeared to follow the Parliament’s all-encompassing request, by inserting the word “relevant”, it provided Swedish officials with the necessary “wiggle room” to restrict access. Employing clever verbal acrobatics and a bit of selective reasoning, the Foreign Ministry’s lawyers were thereby able to sidestep the release of certain sets of records. Still, an obvious question remains: if the withheld documentation was not deemed relevant for the Commission’s work, why bother keeping it classified? What exactly does the government wish to hide from an official review was not permitted to share highly classified information with the public in any case? Helena Jäderblom summed up the situation in an interview with the publication Journalisten, “We believe that they (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have a strange way of looking at things.” [12]
The Commission never learned, nor does it appear to have asked, how many records were actually withheld. Additionally, the censored portions in documentation the Commission was permitted to see did not include any secrecy designations or identifiers which would indicate on what grounds the documentation was censored. [13]
In response to my inquiry on this last point, Helena Wahlstrőm of the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s consular department explained that the number of withheld records “was very low”. She emphasized once again the Foreign Ministry’s earlier assessment that “either the Commission did not need the information to perform its duties or divulging certain information would risk having a negative effect on efforts to secure the release of the individuals in question. [14] “Those documents are so sensitive that the Government was unable to allow access to them”, Wahlstrőm wrote.
A question of the government’s motive and intent
In an interview with Expressen [15] last November Helena Jäderblom went so far as to suggest that the government had chosen the very specific and narrow wording of its formal directives to the Commission intentionally, knowing that it would permit the withholding of certain types of information. “I think that is why the directives were written the way they were”, Jäderblom said. Jag tror att det var därför man hade skrivit direktiven på det sätt som man hade gjort, säger hon.
If cited correctly, Jäderblom’s statement is frankly stunning. Just as noteworthy is the fact that her remark has not drawn any public or official reaction to speak of, including from the parliamentary committee that commissioned the inquiry in the first place. [16] To repeat once more, for emphasis: A prominent jurist and chairperson of an official governmental commission essentially accused the government of not only withholding information from an official investigation, but of sabotaging it from the start. Jäderblom must surely realize that she is talking about possible obstruction and undue influence taking on the part of the government — a serious charge and potential violation of the law.
When I asked her about this in a follow up e-mail exchange in December, she declined to comment about the government’s possible motivation. When asked if the Expressen journalist who interviewed her (Leif Brännstrőm) had misquoted her or misappropriated her comments, she did not respond.
It is evident that the government from the start decided that the Commission members should not be permitted to see some highly sensitive documentation contained in Dawit Isaak’s consular file. The government was clearly aware of this fact already back in 2021, when the Riksdag asked the government to appoint a special Commission of Inquiry. Consequently, this also means that the government intentionally sought to control and restrict the Commission’s review authority, in contrast to the all-encompassing access stipulated by the Riksdag’s Foreign Relations Committee.
Nevertheless, in its final report, the Commission simply noted that due to the government’s refusal to share certain parts of Dawit Isaak’s file, it was unable to carry out its assigned task. Beyond that, it only pointed to “certain shortcomings” in the government’s official handling of both Dawit Isaak’s and also Gui Minhai’s cases. [17]
“To repeat once more, for emphasis: A prominent jurist and chairperson of an official governmental commission essentially accused the government of not only withholding information from an official investigation, but of sabotaging it from the start. Jäderblom must surely realize that she is talking about possible obstruction and undue influence taking on the part of the government — a serious charge and potential violation of the law.”
However, the Commission never formally appealed the Foreign Ministry’s decision to censor Mr. Isaak’s file. Helena Jäderblom took up the issue with Cabinet Secretary Robert Rydberg who confirmed the legal department’s ruling from May 5, 2022. [18]
“There was no way forward”
In our follow-up discussion Ms. Jäderblom presented a strictly technical argument why the Commission did not appeal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ruling. She explained that because “the [legal department’s] action was not a response to a formal request of access to official information [allmän handling], in accordance with the system set out in Paragraph 2 of the Freedom of the Press Act [Tryckfrihetsfőrordning], there was no formal avenue for appeal.” The operative phrase here is “official information”– only decisions regarding such records can be appealed. [19] Apparently, the records at issue were not all deemed official documentation, but presumably involved unofficial papers, such as notes or working papers [arbetspapper] which are not always subject to the official rules of disclosure. [20] Ms. Jäderblom did not provide any additional clarification.
However, when pressed a month earlier by Expressen why she and the Commission did not formally object to the Foreign Ministry’s failure to provide all available records concerning Dawit Isaak, Jäderblom simply said that since the Commission was appointed by the government, it would have “felt strange” to do so.
“I know we could have gone that way, but it would have felt very strange. […] We were a commission appointed by the government. […] Now they didn’t want to give us this information. It was completely clear. There was no one who stepped up from above [the higher authorities — SB]and said that we would get the documents. […] There was no way forward.”
The Commission does not state clearly how exactly the refusal to share documentation and information about Dawit Isaak’s case affected its work. The final report suggests, however, that while the Commission saw no pressing reason to criticize the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s controversial strategy of “engagement” with Eritrea (in order to affect Dawit Isaak’s release), the Commission felt unable to arrive at a clear assessment of this particular approach. Aside from the promotion of various cultural and social contacts, the policy of engaging Eritrea encompasses so-called silent diplomacy, behind-the-scenes negotiations, out of the public eye. This included, among other things, the Swedish government calling for the lifting of UN sanctions against Eritrea in 2019. [21] The Commission noted the lack of information regarding the internal decision-making processes concerning these steps:
“It is clear that the [Swedish] policy of engagement after so many years has not led to any progress. However, it appears that the choice of the course of action has been continuously evaluated, even if not all considerations are clearly documented. In light of the documentation that the Commission has been allowed to review, it sees no reason to criticize the choice of action. However, the Commission points out that this assessment is made based on the fact that the Commission has not had access to all the information in the case. [my emphasis — SB]”
In short, the Commission did nothing because any efforts to appeal the withholding of information were thought to be futile. This summarizes the problem in a nutshell. The Commission clearly had no appetite for confrontation, nor did it seem to consider it useful to pursue the issue as a matter of principle. By their own admission, the Commission members felt that as a governmentally appointed entity, they really should not or could not appeal an official decision by another government office. Arguably, a formal objection or appeal could have sent a strong public signal, as would have been the refusal to issue a final report until the questions at issue were properly evaluated. Apparently, none of the Commission members ever considered resigning their mandate over the matter.
A not-so-independent Commission, plus a tailor-made adjustment to the Swedish Public Access and Secrecy Law
The Swedish Parliament had specifically stipulated that the [government] appointed Commission members should be independent. [22] However, of the three full members — chairperson Helena Jäderblom, Pål Wrange and Ulrika Cronenberg Mossberg, two had close affiliations with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout their careers. Wrange, currently a law professor at Stockholm University, served for eleven years as an international law advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Cronenberg Mossberg is a career diplomat and former Swedish Ambassador to Lithuania. [23]
In its report the Commission notes that several Foreign Ministry officials refused to answer questions posed by the commission, referencing their professional duty to keep certain information confidential [tystnadsplikt]. [24] The Commission appears to have made no effort to release those officials who refused to cooperate with the inquiry from their confidentiality agreements; this even though the Commission had been specifically charged with seeking information from Swedish officials, including certain information that continues to be classified. [24]
Interestingly, the Swedish government was, apparently, not only concerned about what documentation the Commission members would be able to review behind closed doors but also what records and information it might ultimately share with the public. In an extraordinary step, in October 2021, just as the Commission began its investigation, the government proposed an amendment to the Swedish secrecy law [Sekretesslagen 2009:400], referencing specifically the Parliament ordered review of the two cases of Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai. In particular, the government asked to protect personal information “about the state of health of those deprived of their liberty and their relatives, information about what treatment the persons deprived of their liberty may have been subjected to and what was said during any consular visits.” [25] The final version of the law used a more general formulation, stating simply that the Commission may not reveal any “personal or financial information” about the two individuals in question (Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai), “if it can be assumed that the individual or someone close to [them] will suffer harm if the information is disclosed.” [26]
The new law was adopted in December 2021. Bjőrn Tunbäck, board member of Reporters without Borders, wondered at the time why exactly the government required a new secrecy instrument specifically for this investigation? In its proposition of the legislation, the government specifically stressed the law did not constitute an expansion of secrecy, but simply an effort to protect individual privacy — and specifically that of Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai [27] However, the rule of law requires that laws be general in character, rather than aimed at particular individuals or situations. Instead this very specific and highly targeted legal amendment suggests a wish by the government to prevent full insight into how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked and continues to work with these two cases.
“As long as the government is permitted to influence and at least partly control the work of official commissions of inquiries, conflicting loyalties and potential conflicts of interest will diminish both the efficacy and usefulness of official findings.”
In the final analysis, the biggest losers in this controversy are Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai who, it bears reminding, are both Swedish and EU citizens. Under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and other international laws victims of repression and their families have a right to the truth about their cases. The question remains what good these laws and conventions are if they cannot be enforced, even at home [in Sweden]. The Commission of inquiry was specifically authorized to review even highly confidential information. By not insisting on carrying out its assigned task, it squandered an important opportunity to learn all the vital facts of the government’s handling of the two cases.
But possibly, some ripples are now beginning to appear on the otherwise still surface of the pond: The Foreign Policy Committee of the Riksdag recently called the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Director General of legal affairs to brief the Committee on how the Ministry intends to follow up the official Commission report.
As long as the government is permitted to influence and at least partly control the work of official commissions of inquiries, conflicting loyalties and potential conflicts of interest will diminish both the efficacy and use of official findings. Even worse, such interference and efforts to exert control defeat the very purpose of such inquiries. Sadly, this alone constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice.
Facts in the case
January 2021 The Riksdag’s Foreign Policy Committee (FPC) decides to ask the government to create a commission of inquiry regarding “Swedish citizens who are imprisoned abroad because of their use of the right to freedom of expression.“ The FPC issues basic directives for the Commission’s work, stating that it should have access “to all information including information that is classified.” (Utrikesutskottets betänkande 2020/21:UU7)
June — July 2021 The government waits five months to appoint a commission, citing “secrecy restrictions” as a reason for the delay. The government’s finally issues a formal directive to the commission and by July 2021 appoints its members. The instructions closely resemble those of the FPC but insert the crucial word “relevant” — The Commission shall have access “to all relevant documents” instead of to “all documents”. (Direktiv 2021:40). The final report is supposed to be delivered no later than March 2022.
October 2021 — The government issues a proposition for an amendment of the Swedish secrecy law. This proposition is made specifically in reference to the work of the Commission of Inquiry. The text of the proposition spells out in detail what information the government wishes to protect.
December 2021 The proposition becomes law (Kap. 42, Paragraph 9, Section 3).
February 2021 The Commission’s final report is postponed from March until October 2022.
Susanne Berger is the founder and coordinator of the Raoul Wallenberg International Research Initiative (RWI-70) and a Senior Fellow with the Raoul Walleberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR) in Canada.
Notes
[1] For criticism of the original police investigation see, for example,https://www.dn.se/kultur/hans-gunnar-axberger-om-palmeutredningen-nastan-ingenting-fungerade, or https://magasinetfilter.se/reportage/59-minuter-som-forandrade-sverige/ as well as“Säkerhetspolisens hemlighet från mordnatten”, Kvartal.se.
[2] The project leader Professor Christer Jönsson summarized his oncerns in a paper entitled “Sanning och konsekvens” (Truth and Consequence) that he uploaded online. SWEDEN.PDF (statewatch.org) Se även: https://cryptome.org/spooks-se.htm
[3] See Raoul Wallenberg — Utrikesdepartementet, Svensk-Ryska arbetsgruppens rapport, artikel nr UD 00.20, Informationsmaterial, 2000; Nedskjutningen av DC 3-an i Juni 1952 : Rapport från DC 3- utredningen, Serie: Ds : departementsserien, 0284- 6012 ; 1992:5; Arbetsgrupp för efterforskning av i Östersjön förlista och försvunna fartyg och deras besättningar (UD 1993:E) (Collections of papers); also Populär Historia. https://popularhistoria.se/samhalle/svenska-sjoman-sparlost-forsvunna-pa-ostersjon
[4] I served as an independent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group that investigated the Raoul Wallenberg case in Russia (1995–2001). See also Susanne Berger: ”An Inquiry Steered From The Top? Twenty-five years later, still many loose ends in three major Cold War cases”. 1 mars 2015.
[5] See Dagens medicin https://www.dagensmedicin.se/vardens-styrning/politik/coronakommissionen-nekas-ta-del-av-regeringens-underlag/
[6] SOU:55 sid. 18. For the wording of the original government directive se SOU 2022:55, Bilaga 1, sid.125.
” Kommissionen ska ges tillgång till all relevant information, inklusive uppgifter som omfattas av sekretess, som finns i ärendena hos Utrikesdepartementet och utlandsmyndigheterna och som kommissionen behöver för att fullgöra sitt uppdrag. Sådana uppgifter kan omfattas av sekretess enligt 15 kap. 1 § och 36 kap. 7 § offentlighets-och sekretesslagen (2009:400).” Se även utredningskommissionens underlag om Dawit Isaak och Gui Minhai som finns på Riksarkivet: Komm2021/00839/UD 2021:01 — Utredningshandlingar (UD 2021:1). Helena Jäderblom Tjänsteanteckning från 5 maj 2022. Se även utredningskommissionens underlag om Dawit Isaak och Gui Minhai som finns på Riksarkivet: Komm2021/00839/UD 2021:01 — Utredningshandlingar (UD 2021:1). Helena Jäderblom Tjänsteanteckning från 5 maj 2022.
Kommissionen ska ges tillgång till all relevant information, inklusive uppgifter som omfattas av sekretess, som finns i ärendena hos Utrikesdepartementet och utlandsmyndigheterna och som kommissionen behöver för att fullgöra sitt uppdrag. Sådana uppgifter kan omfattas av sekretess enligt 15 kap. 1 § och 36 kap. 7 § offentlighets-och sekretesslagen (2009:400), See SOU 2022:55, Bilaga 1, p.125.
[7] SOU 2022:55, p. 18
[8] ibid
[9] ”Utskottet framhåller även att kommissionen ska ges tillgång till all information, inklusive sekretessbelagd information, och även aktivt söka information från anhöriga, tjänstemän och andra personer som har varit involverade i dessa konsulära ärenden”. Cited in SOU 2022:55, Bilaga 1, p. 124. See also Utrikesutskottets betänkande 2020/21:UU7, sid. 9. 2352861E-8213–40C8-A7F7-FBCB31CCC268 (riksdagen.se)
[10] SOU 2022:55, sid.18
[11] Ibid
[12] See interview with Helena Jäderblom in Journalisten, October 28, 2022.
[13] E-mail from Helena Jäderblom to Susanne Berger, December 9, 2022. In response to my own inquiry, the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s consular department stated only that the number of documents withheld from Dawit Isaak’s consular file is “very low”. E-mail from Helena Wahlstrőm to Susanne Berger, 20 januari 2023. [We can adjust if Wahlstroem provides a specific number].
[14] E-mail from Helena Wahlstrőm to Susanne Berger, 20 January 2023. Wahlstrőm cited specifically Kap. 6, Section 5 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400). This sections states that “en myndighet ska på begäran av en annan myndighet lämna uppgift som den förfogar över, om inte uppgiften är sekretessbelagd eller det skulle hindra arbetets behöriga gång.”
The government’s proposal from October 2021 for a change to the Public Access and Secrecy Law (Offentlighets — och Sekretesslagen, 2009:400) contains an indication what this information may also involve (Se Prop. 2021/22:30, s. 9):”I sin verksamhet förväntas kommissionen även behandla uppgifter om enskilda. Det kan exempelvis röra uppgifter om hälsotillstånd hos såväl de frihetsberövade som anhöriga till dessa, uppgifter om vilken behandling de frihetsberövade kan ha utsatts för och vad som sagts vid eventuella konsulära besök. Uppgifterna kan även röra frågor om personlig säkerhet, anhörigas eventuella kontakter i och med det berörda landet, andra länder, organisationer, juridiska ombud med mera. Även korrespondens med anhöriga och redogörelser från personer som varit i kontakt med de frihetsberövade kommer sannolikt att förekomma i kommissionens verksamhet. Sådana uppgifter kan vara känsliga för de personer som berörs. Om uppgifterna röjs kan det därför antas leda till att de frihetsberövade själva eller närstående till dessa skulle lida skada eller men.”
[15] Leif Brännstrőm. ”Mysteriet med hemliga dokumenten om Isaak”. Expressen, 8 november 8 2022
[16] Repeated inquiries to members of the Riksdag’s Foreign Relations Committee(Hans Wallmark (M), Håkan Svenneling (V), Kenneth G. Forslund (S), Morgan Johansson, received no response.
[17] SOU 2022:55, sid. 11–12
[18] See documentation of the Commission of Inquiry on Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai at the Swedish National Archive (Riksarkivet) Komm2021/00839/UD 2021:01 — Utredningshandlingar (UD 2021:1). See Helena Jäderblom notes of conversation (Tjänsteanteckning) from May 5, 2022 and June 17, 2022 respectively.
[19] 2 § tryckfrihetsförordningen; see also https://www.allmanhandling.se/
[20] ibid
[21] See SOU 2022:55, sid. 72, as well as Martin Schibbye. Jakten på Dawit, Göteborg:Offside Press, 2019. See also SOU 2022:55, p. 61.
[22] SOU 2022:55, p.15. See also Utrikesutskottet: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/2352861E-8213-40C8-A7F7-FBCB31CCC268
[23] The former deputy secretary of the Commission Barbro Elm also is a career diplomat and a former Ambassador to North Korea. Several of the individuals who served as advisors and experts to the Commission are closely affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and associated government agencies. SOU 2022:55, p. 3.
[24] SOU 2022:55, p.18–19
[25] See SOU 2022:55, s. 124. Kommittédirektiv 2021:40, 10 juni 2021: ”[Utrikes]Utskottet framhåller även att kommissionen ska ges tillgång till all information, inklusive sekretessbelagd information, och även aktivt söka information från anhöriga, tjänstemän och andra personer som har varit involverade i dessa konsulära ärenden.”
Both the directives issued by the Riksdag and the government stipulated that the Commission’s work could not interfere with the work of other investigative bodies (i.e.,the Riskdag’s Konstitutionsutskott) or affect the government’s ability to affect the rescue of both Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai. See SOU 2022:55, Bilaga 1, p. 124: “Utskottet framhåller vidare att undersökningskommissionens arbete ska genomföras med beaktande av konstitutionsutskottets roll och funktion enligt regeringsformen och riksdagsordningen och att kommissionens arbete därmed inte får försvåra konstitutionsutskottets granskande uppgift. Kommissionens arbete får inte heller inverka negativt på Utrikesdepartementets pågående arbete för att få Dawit Isaak och Gui Minhai frigivna.” Additionally, the Commission members were and remain restricted today with regards to how much information they can share with the public. Helena Jäderblom stated this explicitly at the official press conference when the Commission presented its official report, October 28, 2022. https://regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/10/overlamning-av-betankandet-granskning-av-arbetet-med-att-forsoka-uppna-frigivning-av-dawit-isaak-och-gui-minhai/ However, none of these restrictions should have affected the Commission’s ability to access classified information as part of its official internal review process.
[26] Regeringens proposition 2021/22:30 p. 16
[27] Offentlighets — och Sekretesslagen (2009:400), Kapitel 42 Undersökningskommissioner 9 § Section 3
[28] Prop. 2021/22:30, p. 10. ”Regeringen vill understryka att det aktuella förslaget handlar om att införa ett starkare sekretesskydd för enskildas personliga eller ekonomiska förhållanden i kommissionens verksamhet och inte om utvidgad sekretess för uppgifter om regeringens, Utrikesdepartementets eller utlandsmyndigheternas agerande [my emphases — SB].”